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Abstract
We analyze whether the credit market anticipated the financial crisis before the regulators using a
methodology that combines the Merton model for the determination of economic capital with Vasicek’s
factor model for asset correlation. Contrary to standard practice, we estimate the credit value at risk
(VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) of a global loan portfolio using CDS spreads because credit derivat-
ives incorporate forward-looking information on future systemic shocks that might be essential in the
estimation of economic capital. We find that one-factor model can generally be a good representation
of correlations in the credit market because of the high inter-sector correlations, although an appro-
priately chosen second factor can provide additional information for risk estimation in stressed times.
We show that there were, indeed, signs of stress in the credit market that were not incorporated in the
determination of economic capital during the crisis and that some financial institutions did not con-
sider properly. The overall impression is that it is not so much that risk models were over-simplified to
anticipate the financial crisis but rather, that they were backward-looking. A potential implication of
our research is that the level of regulatory capital should react to events in the credit market.
JEL classification: E47, G01, G28, G32
Keywords: Forward-looking Asset Correlation, Economic Capital, Asset Allocation, Systemic Risk.
1. Motivation
The most popular approach to determining the economic capital needed for a loan portfolio is
the Merton (1974) ’structural’ model. Its principal advantage is its strong economic rationale, which
explains the default of a firm when the value of its assets falls below the value of its debt. This is the ap-
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2proach followed in the Basel II IRB (Internal Ratings-Based) model to calculate the level of economic
capital for those institutions that use advanced risk models. The correlations among the value of as-
sets from different firms are the central input for the calculation of the level of capital needed to face
unexpected losses in a loan portfolio [see Basel BCBS (2006)]. Unfortunately, asset correlations are not
directly observable in the market and different methods have been proposed for their estimation by
McGinty et al. (2004). In the Basel II model, the correlation across firms is specified as a deterministic
function of the probability of default. With a dataset for 1998-2004, Dullmann et al. (2007) departed
from the Basel II assumption on asset correlation but his results, using various model specifications
for asset correlation, were similar to those from the Basel II IRB approach. The main reason for that
coincidence might be that the Basel II IRB model was calibrated to the KMV database, which is also
used by Dullmann et al. (2007) for a very similar time frame [see Crosbie (1999) and Crosbie (2003) for
more details].
Alternatively, we propose a practical strategy that allows us to estimate economic capital using the
forward-looking information on the market perception of risk contained in CDS spread data. We per-
form an analysis similar to Dullmann, in our case using CDS data, with eleven industries instead of
the six industries used by Dullmann, and for a more recent period, 2006-2012, so that we can distin-
guish among the pre-crisis, global crisis, and post-crisis periods. The implied estimates of economic
capital might provide us with relevant information about future systemic adverse shocks, besides be-
ing a useful tool for risk management and asset allocation. The idea is to place our estimates in the
context of regulatory capital requirement by comparison with the Basel II regulation.6 We want to ex-
plore whether there was some anticipation in the credit market of the upcoming crisis that financial
institutions and regulators ignored. This is related to the deeper question of how the regulation on
capital should react to events in the credit market, because the loan portfolio of financial institutions
is generally valued at historical prices, with a very small sensitivity to the CDS market. Finally, we also
hope to get some insight into what would be the impact on economic capital of using CDS spreads to
mark a loan portfolio to the market.
We estimate the value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) for a global credit portfolio by simu-
lating the occurrence of default across the universe of firms. We consider an equally weighted portfolio
made up of CDS contracts from each of a set of 881 issuers. In the first structural model of default for
a single firm proposed by Merton (1974), default arises when the value of a given firm falls below the
value of its assets. Black and Cox (1976) provided an important extension of Merton’s model. Their
model has a first passage time structure where a default takes place whenever the value of the assets
of a company drops below a barrier level. This model was calibrated by Jacobs (2011). Extending the
model in the context of a single firm has been the object of a large strand of academic literature. Zhou
(2001) and Hull and White (2001) were the first to incorporate default correlation between different is-
6Moreover, for the purpose of regulatory capital the use of more stable inputs like PDs and LGDs may help to avoid an
excessive volatility in profitability metrics.
3suers into the Black and Cox first passage time structural model. The characterization of joint default
probabilities in Zhou (2001) can just be used for two firms. Hull and White (2001) consider an ar-
bitrary number of firms, but their model is computationally time-consuming. Hull et al. (2010) solve
those limitations by providing a way to model default correlation using the Black-Cox structural model
framework. They assume that the value of assets of any given firm follows a geometric Brownian mo-
tion, and calibrate the first passage time model to market data. Then, a one-factor Vasicek correlation
model is used to represent the joint correlation between N firms. A similar analysis is also performed
by Tarashev and Zhu (2008).
We use the first passage time structure by Hull et al. (2010) to estimate default probabilities for each
firm in the portfolio, and we use four alternative specifications of Vasicek-type factor correlation mod-
els to estimate asset correlations. Having a good representation of the correlation among the value of
assets for the different firms in the credit portfolio through their dependence on common risk factors
is crucial for VaR, ES and economic capital estimation. We start by estimating a Modified Distance
to Default (MDD) for each firm and each period using CDS spread data. Correlations between MDD
estimates obtained from rolling window samples are then used to calibrate the alternative correlation
models. They are simulated for each firm throughout the 2006-2012 sample, and the occurrence of
default is evaluated by comparing the change in the value of assets with the threshold consistent with
the probability of default associated by Moody’s to each rating grade. By simulating a large number of
trajectories, we have an empirical distribution of default events for each firm and time period. In case
of default, we compute the loss as (1-R)% of the exposure to that firm, with R being the recovery rate,
and we aggregate losses across the portfolio. The level of VaR is estimated each period as the desired
percentile of the distribution of porfolio P&L, and ES is estimated by integrating over the tail. Weekly
data on recovery rates are taken from Markit. Even though we perform our analysis for a global port-
folio, the model is simulated for each single firm in the sample, so that our methodology could easily
be applied to estimate the VaR and ES of specific portfolios.
The results of our analysis suggest a significant underestimation of capital over the financial crisis.
There were clear signs of stress in the credit market prior to the crisis that were not appropriately
taken into account by some financial institutions, and that regulators did not take into account when
determining capital requirements. The increased correlation in the credit market seems to have been
mainly responsible for the increase in value at risk during the financial crisis, with the increase in the
physical probability of default playing a secondary role. These results are robust to the specification
used for asset correlation, as well as to different modelling choices that we analyze below. They also
arise working with corporate bond data, although we suggest a preference for CDS data because of
their relative simplicity, in spite of the recent shrinking of the CDS market.7 The general time evolution
7Working with bond data requires choosing a particular yield curve as reference as well as assuming that bond payments are
compensation for credit risk, ignoring other components like a possible liquidity premium. Choosing a representative bond
from the set of bonds outstanding at a given point in time for the same issuer is an added complexity that does not arise with
CDS data.
4of value at risk estimates obtained from credit and bond data is broadly similar, although there are also
noticeable differences at some specific points in time that deserve to be the object of future research.
Section 2 contains a description of our dataset, while the correlation models are presented in Sec-
tion 3. In Section 4 we detail the results from VaR estimation, and we relate our results to the different
stages of the financial crisis. In section 5 we compute estimates of Expected Shortfall. In section 6 we
analyze the results obtained with corporate bond data. To validate our models, in Section 7 we exam-
ine whether our results are in line with rating agencies. In Section 8 we present the results obtained
with a two-systemic risk factor model. Implications for regulatory credit risk modelling are discussed
in Section 9. We close with the main conclusions and open questions in Section 10.
2. Description of the Data
We have used the database provided by Markit, the main supplier of CDS prices [see Markit (2008)
and Markit (2012)]. We selected the fields: ticker, tier, spread, sector and region. The ticker gives in-
formation on the key name of the issuer. Tier contains the type of debt that is to be delivered in the
event of a default. This might be SEDCOM Secured Debt (Corporate/Financial), SNRFOR Senior Unse-
cured Debt (Corporate/Financial), SOVEREIGN Debt (Government), SUBLT2 Subordinated or Lower
Tier 2 Debt (Banks), JRSUBUT2 Junior Subordinated or Upper Tier 2 Debt (Banks), and PREFT1 Pref-
erence Shares, or Tier 1 Capital (Banks). Markit provides information on CDS spreads with different
tenors: 6M, 1Y, 2Y, 3Y, 4Y, 5Y, 7Y, 10Y, 15Y, 20Y, and 30Y. All these prices are composite; that is, for a given
restructuring event, issuer and currency, they are the average of prices provided by different financial
institutions. The classification of sectors in the Markit database is based on the ICB (Industry Clas-
sification Benchmark), which distinguishes four levels: industry, supra-sector, sector, and subsector.
We work at the Markit industry level, which considers eleven industries: basic materials, consumer
goods, consumer services, energy, financials, health care, industrials, technology, telecommunication
services, utilities, and government (Markit category). Markit also considers thirteen different regions:
Africa, Asia, Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Europe, India, Latin America, Middle East, North America,
Oceania, Offshore, Pacific and Supranational, but we have not made any geographical distinction in
our analysis.
Even though we estimate the one-year ahead probability of default, we use the daily senior 5-year
CDS contract with the standard currency and the restructuring clause because of its liquidity and rep-
resentativeness.8 We analyze the period from January 2006 to December 2012, an undoubtedly rel-
evant period of time for the credit market, covering the recent global financial crisis. We have just
considered those issuers for which we have a daily price for the senior 5-year CDS contract. These
filters leave us with a sample of 881 issuers, most of them located in Europe, North America and Asia.
8Such choice implicitely assumes that the stochastic structure of returns allows for time aggregation
5Table 1 summarizes information on the issuers by industry, region, and industry/region. As interest
rate r we take the 5-year swap rate for the reference currency of each CDS issuer: the euro swap rate
for Europe, USD rate for America and the yen rate for Japan.
Finally, we have used Moody’s database to assign a daily rating to each different issuer over the
2006-2012 period. Extending the sample farther would lead us to lose a number of firms. Since our
purpose is to discuss the forward-looking information in the credit market during the crisis, we de-
cided to stop in 2012.9 Tables 2 and 3 present the distribution of sector ratings on 30 June 2006 and
30 June 2012, showing a clear deterioration in almost all industries during the 2007-2012 crisis period,
with the exceptions of the energy and health care industries. The last column in Table 3 displays the
probability of default associated with each rating in Ou et al. (2013).10 Using this correspondence
between ratings and default probabilities, we present in Figure 10.1 the evolution over time of the
sectorial probabilities of default, as the average across firms in each sector.11 Default probabilities
increased during the crisis period, although in an heterogeneous manner. The probability of default
in the financial sector increased considerably during the crisis period, reflecting the fact that it was
mainly a global financial crisis, but only after mid-2008, not as much as one would expect a posteriori.
The less cyclical sectors, like utilities, energy and basic materials had a lower probability of default, on
average. On the contrary, the perception of risk in the more cyclical sectors, like consumer goods or
consumer services was highly affected by the global crisis and, in fact, their increase in default prob-
ability started somewhat earlier. Other sectors, like healthcare or telecommunications show just a
moderate increase in the probability of default, in line with the increase experienced by the default
probability for the whole sample of firms. It is remarkable that on December 2012, the increase in the
probability of default had not reverted yet to the levels previous to the crisis.
(INSERT HERE TABLES 1, 2, 3 )
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 10.1)
3. A model of default correlations
The specification of the full set of joint default probabilities among firms in the sample would be
unmanageable. There are 2N pair default events for N obligors, which would be impossible to handle
even for a relatively low number of counterparties. The problem can be solved by using structural cor-
relation models, which can use alternative sources for assessing default correlation [see Schönbucher
(2000)]: i) Actual rating and default events are the most natural source, although they are hardly ever
used in practice. Since defaults are very rare events, obtaining a significant number of observations
9An analysis with a longer sample, but less firms, is performed later on, when we compare the results provided by CDS data
and bond data.
10The data is taken from Exhibit 23 in : Annual Credit Loss Rates by Letter Rating, 1982-2012* in Ou et al. (2013)
11Changes in PD are mainly due to re-ratings of credit.
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on defaults would require a long history and the economic circumstances of a very remote past may
not be relevant today, ii) Equity correlations, since it usually claimed that credit and equity are related.
That belief is based on Merton (1974) ’structural’ model which provided an explicit relationship among
default risk and the capital structure of the firm. Hence, equity returns are often used as a proxy for
asset returns when using structural models. The advantage of using equity data is that there is a good
history of company prices. The main limitation of this approach is that the link between equity, debt,
and the value of assets (leverage) is not constant, and it is difficult to measure and judge. For example,
two firms can be highly correlated from the point of view of equity returns, and at the same time, ex-
hibit a low asset correlation, iii) Credit spreads provide continuous information on the default risk of
traded bonds, although bond prices may be influenced by illiquidity factors. Moreover, a large strand
of literature shows that there are diverse determinants of credit spreads, not all of them necessarily
linked to default risk [see, among many others, Ericsson et al. (2009), Karagozoglu and Jacobs (2016)].
Also, there is no theoretical justification for a direct link between credit spread correlation and default
correlation. For example, Huang and Huang (2012) found that credit risk accounts for only a small
fraction of the observed corporate-Treasury yield spreads for investment grade bonds of all maturit-
ies, the fraction being still smaller for short maturity bonds, and it accounts for a much higher fraction
of yield spreads for junk bonds.
None of these approaches is free of limitations. We will use the concept of Distance to Default as
in Merton’s model combined with CDS data to derive estimates of default probabilities.
3.1. Modelling default
We follow Tarashev and Zhu (2008) to model the cross-sectional interdependence of default events
as driven by the correlation of a firm-specific ’default trigger’ random variable, which is a one-dimensional
summary of credit quality and it is extracted from CDS spreads, as explained below. The default-trigger
variable will therefore comprise all the information that is considered relevant and processed in single-
name CDS spreads. This is the Z-score methodology that banks use in stress testing to model default
correlation in project stressed rating-migration matrices.
As in Tarashev and Zhu (2008), we refer to the default-trigger variable as ’the value of firm’s assets’
and incorporate it into a Merton-type model of the firm.12 We start by assuming that the asset value
of any given firm i follows a geometric Brownian motion as:
dVi,t = µiVi,tdt+ σiVi,tdWi,t, i = 1, 2, ...n (3.1)
12Merton’s model has been extensively used in the credit risk literature. As a recent example, Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2013)
use it to show the association between default correlations and default probabilities.
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Where µi represents the expected growth rate of the value of assets for firm i, σi is the volatility of
asset value, Wi,t is a Wiener process, and n is the number of firms. We assume µi and σi are constant.
Applying Ito’s lemma to the logarithmic transformation, we have:
dlnVi,t =
(
µi − σ
2
i
2
)
dt+ σidWi,t (3.2)
And hence, starting from Vi,0, the value of firm’s i assets at each point in time is:
lnVi,t = lnVi,0 +
(
µi − σ
2
i
2
)
t+ σi (Wi,t −Wi,0) (3.3)
In Merton’s model, each firm receives a single loan [see Vasicek (2002)] and the firm defaults at
maturity T if the value of its assets Vi falls below the contractual value of its debts Di. The Modified
Distance to Default of firm i [following Hull et al. (2010)] at any point in time t is defined as the log-
arithm of the leverage ratio, i.e., the value of firm i assets divided by the contractual value of its debts,
Vi,t/Di,t, scaled by volatility, σi:
MDDi,t =
lnVi,t − lnDi,t
σi
(3.4)
Using (3.3) and applying Ito’s lemma under the assumption that the contractual value of debtsDi,t
is constant over time, we can see that dMDDi,t has a drift: γi =
µi−σ2i /2
σi
and a unit variance:13
dMDDi,t = γidt+ dWi,t (3.5)
Following Leland (2004), Hull et al. (2010) and Tarashev and Zhu (2008) the probability that the
market value of assets of a given firm i may fall below the value of its debt at any time in the next τ
years is given by:
PDi,t(τ,MDDi,t, γi) = 1− Φ(MDDi,t + τγi√
τ
) + exp(−2MDDi,tγi)Φ(−MDDi,t + τγi√
τ
) (3.6)
13Jump diffusion elements have been introduced in some models to avoid the fact that under an Arithmetic Browninan mo-
tion, MDD will diverge over time to zero with probability 1, which may be reasonable in a growing economy, but not so much
in downturns.
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On the other hand, under market clearing, the present value of CDS premium payments (left-hand
side of the equation) must be equal the present value of protection payments (the right-hand side):
si,t
ˆ t+T
t
e−rττΓi,τdτ = LGDi,t
ˆ t+T
t
e−rττqi,τdτ (3.7)
where rτ stands for the risk-free rate of return, si,t is the CDS spread on firm i at time t,LGDi,τ is the
date-t expectation of loss given default, and qi,τ denotes the (annualized) unconditional risk-neutral
default intensity, so that PDi,τ ≡
´
qi,vdv and Γi,τ ≡ 1−
´ τ
0
qi,vdv is the associated risk-neutral survival
probability over the following τ years. Under the standard simplifying assumptions that rτ and qi,τ are
expected to be constant over time and LGD is independent of the variable(s) triggering default event,
the previous equation implies that the one-year risk-neutral PD equals:
PDi,t = qi,t =
atsi,t
atLGDi,t + bisi,t
(3.8)
where at ≡
´ t+T
t
e−rτdτ and bt ≡
´ t+T
t
τe−rτdτ .14
The right hand side of equations (3.6) and (3.8) should give us the same PD estimate, which allows
us to solve for MDD for a one-year horizon (τ = 1).15
Our assumption that the volatility, the drift and the contractual value of debts are constant could be
relaxed following the analysis in Du et al. (2016). That would be a relevant extension of our model that
would allow for the analysis of interesting issues regarding the risk of default that cannot be discussed
in our simplified framework.
3.2. Correlation models with a single systemic factor
To obtain sensible value-at-risk estimates from the simulation exercise it is crucial to maintain the
appropriate correlations among the change over time in the value of assets of the different firms. We
initially follow Dullmann et al. (2007) to consider one-factor correlation models. In a later section we
will extend his analysis to compare with alternative model specifications with two sources of systemic
risk.
14When running simulations below we will use the closed form expressions for these two integrals,
´ t+T
t e
−rτdτ = 1
r
e−rt(1−
e−rT ) and
´ t+T
t τe
−rτdτ = 1
r
e−rt
[
( 1
r
+ t)− ( 1
r
+ t+ T )e−rT
]
15Once we have MDD data for each firm and time period, we could also estimate the correlation ρi,j between the value of
assets of any two firms by: ρi,j = corr(∆lnVi,t,∆lnVj,t) = corr(∆MDDi,0,∆MDDj,0), which would allow us to analyze
interesting risk management issues, but we do not pursue that line of analysis here.
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In models with one systemic risk factor, standardized percent changes in the value of assets of firm
i, vi,t =
lnVi,t−lnVi,t−1
σi
, are represented as the aggregate of two uncorrelated Normal(0,1) components,
one being a risk factor X common to other firms, and a second one being a firm-specific, idiosyncratic
shock, ξi:
vi,t = riX +
√
1− r2i ξi, (3.9)
As a consequence, the return on the firm’s i assets will also follow a Normal(0,1) distribution. In this
model, the systemic risk factor X may be global, being common to all firms in the sample, or sector-
specific. In turn, the ri parameters can be firm-specific or sector-specific, depending on the model,
which it will give rise to four different correlation models. Correlations across firms then emerge from
the common risk factor. From (3.3) and (3.5) we have: vi,t =
lnVi,t−lnVi,t−1
σi
= γi
1
σi
+ (Wi,t −Wi,t−1) =
γi
(
1
σi
− 1
)
+ 4MDDi,t, so that we can use the weekly changes in the modified distance to default
4MDDi,t as a proxy for vi,t in equation (3.9) to estimate the correlation parameters ri .
3.2.1. Basel II IRB model (global systemic risk factor)
The simplest one-factor correlation model considers a decomposition of changes in the value of
assets of each firm, vi,1 into a common systemic global factor, X, representing an unobserved state (it
could be the state of the economy or the level of stress in credit markets) and a firm specific factor, ξi :
vi,1 = riX +
√
1− r2i ξi (3.10)
where X, ξ1,ξ2......,ξn are mutually independent standard Normal variables, with n being the total
number of issuers in our sample. The
√
1− r2i ξi term represents the company specific or idiosyncratic
risk. Our first model follows Basel II in choosing the value of r2i as a function of the probability of
default of firm i as:
r2i (PDi) = 0.24− 0.12 · (1− exp−50·PDi) (3.11)
and we take the positive square root of r2i (PDi) to simulate trajectories for the value of assets of
each firm. This function was proposed by Lopez (2004) by calibration of the one-factor KMV model to
replicate empirically observed correlations.16
16For a critical discussion of this model, see Gianfrancesco et al. (2011).
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3.2.2. Market model (global systemic risk factor)
The market model considers again a common global risk factor X for all issuers, as in (3.10). The
difference with the Basel II IRB model is that the correlation parameter ri is now defined endogenously.
Since the model implies a linear correlation:
Corr (vi,1, X) = Cov (vi,1, X) = Cov(riX +
√
1− r2i ξi , X) = riV ar(X) = ri i = 1, 2, ..., n (3.12)
we can estimate ri for each firm as the correlation between weekly changes in ∆MDDi,t as a proxy
for the value of firms’ assets vi,1 and the chosen common risk factor X .17
The correlation between the value of assets for any two firms, i, j will be: Corr (vi,1, vj,1) = Cov(riX+√
1− r2i ξi, rjX+
√
1− r2j ξj) = rirj , with independence of whether they belong or not to the same sec-
tor.
3.2.3. Sectorial Market model (global systemic risk factor)
As in the Market model above, the Sectorial Market model assumes that all firms in a given sector
share the same risk factor, but it restricts the correlation parameter to be the same for all firms in a
given sector.
vi,1 = rsX +
√
1− r2sξi (3.13)
Correlations with the risk factor are:
Corr (vi,1, X) = Cov (vi,1, X) = Cov(rsX +
√
1− r2sξi, X) = rsV ar(X) = rs (3.14)
an equality that holds for each single firm in sector s . Hence, a sensible robust estimate of the rs
parameter to avoid the influence of potential outliers would be the median of intra-sector correlations
between changes in the value of each firm and the sectorial index:
17This is similar in spirit to the Generalized Method of Moments estimator in that we choose parameter values so that the
model implied correlations between changes in the value of assets of individual borrowers and the systemic factor be equal to
the analogue sample moments.
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rs = medi∈ s [Corr (vi,1, X)] (3.15)
The correlation between the time evolution of the value of assets for two firms,i, j in sectors s, z
will be: Corr (vi,1, vj,1) = Cov(rsX +
√
1− r2sξi, rzX +
√
1− r2zξj) = rsrz, while firms i and j in the
same sector s will have a correlation: Corr (vi,1, vj,1) = Cov(rsX +
√
1− r2sξi, rsX +
√
1− r2sξj) = r2s
3.2.4. Sectorial model (sectorial systemic risk factor)
In the Sectorial model we consider a different risk factor for each sector. For a firm i in sector s,
this model assumes that changes in the value of assets are driven by the sectorial systemic factor Xs
according to:
vi,1 = rsXs +
√
1− r2sξi (3.16)
Therefore, rs measures firm i´s sensitivity to its own sector systemic risk. The ξi terms represent
again idiosyncratic shocks, independent across firms. Since the correlations with the sectorial index
are:
Corr (vi,1, Xs) = Cov (vi,1, Xs) = Cov(rsXs +
√
1− r2sξi, Xs) = rs (3.17)
then, the rs parameter can be estimated by:
rs = medi∈ s [Corr (vi,1, Xs)] (3.18)
The sectorial factor returns {Xs}s=1,2......N will have a correlation matrix:
V ar(X1, X2, X3, ....., XN ) =

1 ω12 ω13 ...... ω1N
ω21 1 ω23 ...... ω2N
ω31 ω32 1 ...... ω3N
..... ... ... 1 ...
ωN1 ωN2 ωN3 .... 1

(3.19)
3.3 Time evolution of correlations 12
so that inter-sector correlations ωsz could be estimated by the sample correlation between the
sectorial factor returns for the s and z sectors: ωsz = Corr (Xs, Xz) , s, z = 1, 2, ..., N . The correla-
tion between changes in the value of assets for two firms, i, j in sectors s, z will be: Corr (vi,1, vj,1) =
Cov (vi,1, vj,1) = rsrzωsz, while for firms i and j in the same sector s, we will have: Corr (vi,1, vj,1) =
rsrsωss = r
2
s.
3.2.5. Individual Sectorial model (sectorial systemic risk factor)
In the Individual Sectorial model, borrower i´s standardised asset return is driven by the sector
systemic factor Xs according to:
vi,1 = riXs +
√
1− r2i ξi, (3.20)
The correlation parameter ri is now firm-specific. Since the correlation with the sectorial factor is:
Corr (vi,1, Xs) = Cov (vi,1, Xs) = Cov(riXs +
√
1− r2i ξi, Xs) = ri (3.21)
we can now estimate a different correlation parameter ri for each issuer i in sector s.18
ri = Corr (vi,1, Xs) , i = 1, 2, ..., n ; s = 1, 2, ..., N (3.22)
Where N denotes the number of sectors. The correlation between the change in the value of assets
for firms i and j in the same sector s is: Corr (vi,1, vj,1) = rirjωss = rirj , while for two firms i, j in
different sectors s, z, we will have: Corr (vi,1, vj,1) = rirjωsz.
(INSERT HERE TABLE 4)
3.3. Time evolution of correlations
In this section we analyze the time evolution of the estimated asset correlations. To reduce the
amount of noise in CDS spreads, we work with weekly averages of daily data, and we use rolling win-
dow samples of 52 weeks to estimate the correlations between weekly changes in the value of assets
for a given firm and the risk factor. We repeat this process 313 times, since we have 365 weekly data
18Notice that we estimate a single parameter for each firm using the time series for the value of assets of that firm, so that
there is no problem with the number of degrees of freedom.
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points for each variable.19 According to each model, we use either a global or a sectorial risk factor,
and the ri parameters are estimated as explained in the previous sections.
Regarding the choice of risk factors for the correlation models, one possibility would be to draw on
business cycle variables, volatility indices, or illiquidity indicators, among others. We preferred to rely
on using a Global Credit Risk Factor (GRF) in the models that incorporate a global risk factor, and a
Sectorial Credit Risk Factor (SCRF) in the models that incorporate a sectorial risk factor. We estimate
the GRF as the first principal component of weekly changes in CDS spreads for all the 881 firms in
the sample. The SCRF factors were estimated as the first principal component of weekly changes in
CDS spreads for the firms in each sector. This choice of global risk factors was successfully used in
Chamizo and Novales (2016a) to decompose credit risk for individual firms into systemic and idiosyn-
cratic components.
Figure 10.2 shows the time evolution of the median correlation of firms in each sector over the
2006-2012 period. Intra-sector correlations were low before mid-2007, when they increased sharply
in all sectors. They decreased between September 2008 and the beginning of 2010, increasing some-
what at that point. After a new reduction they approached the pre-crisis levels, only to rise again in
mid-2011 because of the downgrade of US debt. But it is clear that intra-sector credit correlations in
stressed times are high, reflecting the greater importance of common sectorial and global risk factors
(we provide a detailed description of each phase in section 4 below). The highest median intra-sector
correlations arise in the government and the energy sectors, possibly because of the perception of po-
tential contagion inside each monetary area. Intra-sector asset correlations are lower in healthcare
and technology sectors, among others.
(INSERT HERE FIGURES 10.2, 10.3 AND 10.4)
Figure 10.3 displays median correlations between each sector and the financial sector, which have
been consistently high over the sample, and more so in stressed periods. They increased at the onset
of the crisis, in the summer of 2007, and also at the time of the European sovereign debt crisis, and
they remained high, in the neighborhood of 0.90, at the end of 2012. The financial sector displays a
high correlation with the industrial sector, possibly because the latter includes real estate, to which
financial institutions had large exposures.20 Healthcare and technology are the sectors having the
lowest correlation with the financial sector. Correlations with the utilities sector in Figure 10.4 differ
noticebly among sectors, but they swiftly increased in mid-2007. In mid-2011 they were back to the
pre-crisis levels, only to rise again sharply in line with the behavior shown by intrasector correlations.
Similar results, obtained under a different methodological approach, have been used by Chamizo and
Novales (2016b) to suggest sectorial asset allocation recommendations.
19With 365 data points in the sample, we are forced to use rolling windows, even at the cost of introducing autocorrelation in
the estimated parameters.
20The CAMEL (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity) regulatory bank ratings includes com-
mercial real estate as a proportion of total assets as a measure of asset quality.
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Table 5 shows descriptive sectorial statistics for the correlations between the time series of estim-
ated MDD and the global credit risk factor or the sectorial credit risk factor, respectively. As expec-
ted, correlations with the SCRF are generally higher than those with the GRF. Median correlations are
higher than average correlations, showing that the distribution of the linear correlation coefficients is
skewed to the left.
Figure 10.5 shows the empirical density of correlation coefficients between the MDD for each firm
and the global risk factor at the beginning and the end of the sample (2007, 2012). Initially, 6% of the
firms had zero-asset correlation with the systemic risk factor. At the end of the sample, that proportion
was reduced to almost zero. We can see an evident shift to the right in the distribution of correlations,
which were generally higher after the financial crisis than before the crisis.
4. Credit VaR estimates
In this section we report value-at-risk estimates for a global credit portfolio, made up by investing
a 1/881 fraction of the initial money amount in each of the 881 issuers in our sample. Value-at-risk
estimates are obtained by simulation of the proposed correlation models.
We start by simulating one million trajectories for the standardized global factors and sectorial
factors, as well as for the idiosyncratic components of all firms in the sample, assuming a standard
normal distribution for each one of them. Values for the sectorial factors are generated taking into
account the correlations among them using the appropriate Cholesky factor, while idiosyncratic com-
ponents are uncorrelated. Then, using the estimated correlation parameters, we can easily generate
time paths for vi,1.
By definition, firm i defaults the first time period when 4MDDi,t < N−1(PDi,t−1). But we have
already seen that, under our maintained assumptions:4MDDi,t = γi+(Wi,t −Wi,t−1) = lnVi,t−lnVi,t−1σi =
vi,t, so that we will have default whenever vi,t < N−1(PDi,t−1). Once we have estimates for the cor-
relation parameters, we can use each model to simulate trajectories for vi,t . We start from the initial
period distance to default, provided by (3.8) as a function of PDi,0, and we check whether the default
condition holds at any time period. In that comparison we use the PD associated to the Moody’s rating
of each firm in the portfolio each period.
Along each simulated trajectory, the percentage portfolio loss is determined byLoss(%) =
881∑
i=1
LGDi·
1vi,1≤N−1(PDi)/881, where the loss-given-default is LGDi = 1 − Recoveryi, and data for Recoveryi is
taken from the Markit database for each issuer. That way, we have 1,000,000 numerical P&L estimates
for each firm that are aggregated into portfolio losses for each time period. Then, we take the 99.9th
percentile, q, of the distribution of portfolio losses to determine the V aR of the portfolio under each
model.
Finally, we take as a benchmark the V aR defined in the Basel II IRB model for corporate exposures
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as:
V aRBaselII−IRB99.9% =
1
881
881∑
i=1
LGDi ·N
N−1(PDi) +
√
r2PDiN
−1(1− q)√
1− r2PDi
 (4.1)
r2PDi = 0.24− 0.12 · (1− exp−50·PDi) (4.2)
Figure 10.6 shows VaR estimates from the different one-factor correlation models (Market, Sectorial
Market, Sectorial and Individual Sectorial). The four correlation models considered generate a similar
pattern. This is to be expected, since they use the same market information, but several points are
worth to be mentioning:
1. Models that consider individual correlation parameters lead to similar VaR estimates over the
sample period. The time series for VaR estimates from the Market model and the Individual
Sectorial model remain close at any time, with a median difference of 42 basis points (b.p.). This
suggests that, as suspected, inter-sector correlations may have been very high during the 2007-
2012 period. The BIS II model generated a clearly insufficient level of regulatory capital from the
summer of 2007 onwards.
2. On the contrary, the Sectorial Market model yields a higher VaR estimate than the Market model
over the June 2007-December 2012 period, with a median difference between VaR estimates
above 200 b.p., a result in line with Dullmann et al. (2007). Thus, if we use the median correl-
ation for an issuer instead of his “true” individual correlation, the change in VaR estimation can
be considerable. This result suggests that some issuers with a large contribution to market VaR
had a correlation with the common factor below the sector median correlation. Therefore, when
we replace the issuer specific correlation by the median sector correlation, VaR estimates in-
crease. That was not the case before the first occurrence of the crisis (June 2006-May 2007). The
comparison between the Sectorial VaR and the Individual Sectorial VaR is similar, for the same
reasons.
3. Finally, the difference between VaR estimates from the Market model and the Sectorial model
combines two effects. On the one hand, the use of different common factors for the sectors
in the Sectorial model allows for a higher diversification and hence, a lower VaR than in the
Market one-factor model. On the other hand, the use of the median intra-sector correlation in-
stead of the individual intra-sector correlation tends to increase VaR for the June 2007-December
2012 period, as explained above. Together with the previous remarks, the comparison between
these two models shows that when specifying correlation models, the use of firm-specific versus
sector-specific correlation parameters makes more difference for VaR estimation than the choice
between using a global factor versus a set of sectorial factors. Whether these choices have an ef-
fect on the accuracy of VaR estimates should be analyzed by backtesting procedures, although a
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significantly longer sample would be required to get any conclusive evidence.
4. With 1,000,000 simulations, the confidence interval bands at reasonable significance levels [see
Kendall and Stuart (1977)] are very narrow, implying that the fluctuations observed in VaR estim-
ates or the differences in estimated VaR from different models are not just due to sampling error.
5. The residuals from regressions of weekly changes of our estimated VaR on weekly changes of our
correlation estimates and the PD data from Moody’s turned out to be very similar to those of the
regression that uses correlation estimates as the only explanatory variable. Such an observation
suggests the increased correlation in the credit market as the main cause of the increase in VaR
during the financial crisis, with the increase in the physical probability of default playing a sec-
ondary role. This might have happened because rating firms did not update their downgrade
data fast enough or because their over-the-cycle ratings are, by nature, not too sensitive to what
are considered to be short-term events in the market.
4.1. A narrative of the financial crisis as reflected in our credit VaR estimates
There is a clear association between the different periods that can be observed in our VaR estim-
ates and the economic events that occurred during the 2006-2012 period. We can distinguish several
phases of this most serious crisis since the Great Depression (the index number for each phase is also
shown on the graph):21
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 10.6 )
1. Subprime crisis: 2 April 2007: New Century Financial, largest U.S. subprime lender, filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, announcing the departure of more than half the workforce. July 2007:
Bear Stearns’ BSC.N $850 million Asset-Backed Securities Fund experienced sharp declines in
July, prompting some investors to seek redemption of their investments. 9 August 2007: BNP
Paribas announced that it was ceasing activity in three hedge funds that specialized in US mort-
gage debt. It then became clear that there were tens of trillions of dollars worth of dodgy de-
rivatives swilling round which were worth a lot less than the bankers had previously imagined.
Nobody knew how big the losses were, and banks stopped doing business with each other. Dur-
ing this first phase, our estimate of Market VaR increased from 6.02% in March 2007 to 12.25% at
the beginning of August 2007, reflecting the current conditions of the economy at that time.
2. Lehman default: 17 February 2008: Northern Rock was nationalized in what was announced as
a temporary measure, although it would be nearly four years before it returned to the private
sector. 16 March 2008: Bear Stearns was acquired for $2 a share by JP Morgan Chase in a fire
sale avoiding bankruptcy. The deal was backed by the Federal Reserve, providing up to $30bn
to cover possible Bear Stearns losses. 19 June 2008: Managers of the Bear Stearns CDO hedge
21Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Luis, The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Bloomberg and The Guardian.
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funds that crashed in 2007 were arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation accused of mis-
representing their funds’ true condition to investors, although they were acquitted. 7 September
2008: The US government bailed out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 15 September 2008: the US
government allowed the Lehman Brothers investment bank to go bankrupt. Up to that point,
it had been assumed that governments would always step in to bail out any bank that got into
serious trouble, as with Bear Stearns in the US and Northern Rock in the UK. During this period
Market VaR increased from 12.24% on 22 February 2008 to 14.57% on 10 October 2008, reaching
one of the highest historical VaR levels.
3. US Stimulus Act: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) (Pub.L. 111–5),
commonly referred to as the Stimulus or Recovery Act, was an economic stimulus package en-
acted by the 111th United States Congress in February 2009 and signed into law on 17 February
2009 by President Barak Obama. 2 April 2009: At the London G20, world leaders committed
themselves to a $5tn (£3tn) fiscal expansion, an extra $1.1tn in resources to help the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and other global institutions boost jobs and growth, and to reform the
banks. During this period of government stimulus measures, we observe that the Market VaR
decreased from 13.14% on 23 January 2009 to 9.41% on 8 January 2010. It is worthwhile to no-
tice the downward stickiness in VaR, which it did not decreased proportionally as much as it had
increased during the previous two events.
4. Eurozone crisis: 27 April 2010: Greek debt was downgraded to junk on May 2, 2010. In a move
that signaled the start of the eurozone crisis, Greece was bailed out for the first time, after euro-
zone finance ministers agreed loans worth =C110bn. This intensified the austerity program in
the country, sending hundreds of thousands of protesters to the streets. 28 November 2010:
European ministers agreed a bailout for Ireland worth =C85bn. This marked the point at which
the focus of concern switched from the private to the public sector. Market VaR started this
period at 10.31% on 29 January 2010, ending it at 13.39% on 31 December 2010.
5. EU measures: 11 March 2011: The EU summit agreed to expand powers of the European Finan-
cial Stability Facility (EFSF) to allow it to buy debt in primary markets and tap its full =C440bn in
firepower. The EU also reached preliminary agreement to cut the rates on emergency loans to
Greece by 100 basis points for the first three years and extend maturities of the loans to 7.5 years.
21 March 2011: EU finance ministers decided on mechanisms for allowing the region’s perman-
ent bailout mechanism, the ESM, to lend =C500bn from 2013. 5 May 2011: The ECB bailed out
Portugal. 13 June 2011: S&P cut Greece to CCC, the lowest rating for any country that S&P re-
views in the world. During this period, troubles in Europe did not extend to the rest of the world,
and the Market VaR decreased from 13.08% on 14 January 2011 to 8.53% on 1 July 2011.
6. US rating downgrade: 5 August 2011: S&P downgraded US sovereign debt, which had had an
AAA credit rating from S&P since 1941. The S&P 500 Stock Index had fallen 10.8 percent in the
previous ten trading days on concerns that the U.S. economy might have been heading into an-
other recession and because the European debt crisis had worsened. 15 September 2011: ECB
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offered banks unlimited dollar loans for three months as the worsening debt crisis sparked con-
cern over some institutions struggling to access U.S. currency. 17 September 2011: U.S. Treasury
Secretary urged European officials to deal with the crisis and avoid “catastrophic risks” after fly-
ing to a meeting of European Union finance chiefs in Poland. 19 September 2011: Standard &
Poor’s cut Italy’s credit rating for the first time in almost five years, downgrading it to A from A+.
7 October 2011: Fitch cut Spain to AA- and Italy to A+. 12 March 2012: Unemployment in Europe
reached its highest level ever. 12 June 2012: The level of Spanish borrowing reached a record
high. The consequences of the US downgrade were very deep, with Market VaR increasing from
8.52% on 5 August 2011 to 15.44% on 22 June 2012, the highest Market VaR during the 2006-
2012 period. Credit VaR and regulatory capital based on backward looking correlation estimates
were depressed in this period, while many international and large regional banks were reporting
elevated default rates well into 2012.
7. Draghi measures: 26 July 2012: ECB president Mario Draghi unexpectedly gave his strongest
defense yet of the euro, prompting markets to rally. Thus, Market VaR went down from 15.44%
to 11.78% at the end of 2012.
These events led to an increased asset correlation, as well as to higher volatility, in estimates of re-
quired capital. For instance, the increase in average CDS spreads by 23% during the third week of July
2007 brought up an increase in average correlation (based on MDD changes) from 0.25 to 0.38. In the
following week, the downturn in the credit market was also quite pronounced, with another average
increase of 13% in CDS spreads.22
4.2. Robustness analysis
In this section we report the results of several analyses of sensitivity of our value-at-risk estimates
to different modelling choices. They have to do with the value of the drift in the stochastic process for
the value of firms’ assets, the exclusion from our sample of the more idiosyncratic sectors, and the use
of statistical filters to smooth out the excess noise in CDS data.
Numerical value of the drift parameter: We tried different values of the drift γ in the [0, 0.1] interval
to solve equation (3.6), but the estimates of the asset correlations ρi,j are virtually insensitive to the
chosen value of γ, as advanced by Tarashev and Zhu (2008). Using γ = 0 versus γ = 0.1 in the Market
model leads to a difference in the 275.753 correlation estimates [881 issuers, times 313 weekly obser-
vations], r2i = [Corr(∆MDDi,∆X)]
2, between 11.32 and 10.22 basis points. Hence, we just report
below estimation results for γ = 0 .
22These market movements were just the reflection of the volatility in correlation estimates for particular issuers. For instance,
the spread in the 5-year CDS contract for GAP (one of the largest American multinational clothing and accessory retailers)
went up from 125 to 150 basis points (b.p.) during the third week of July 2007, reaching 175 basis points the following week.
Incorporating these two weekly outlier returns caused the correlation estimate for GAP to increase considerably, contributing
to a sharp increase in correlation in the credit market and hence, significantly raising capital requirements.
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Exclusion of idiosyncratic sectors: We estimated again the credit value at risk of our global portfolio
excluding the Government and Financial sectors, since they have a different nature than the rest of
corporate sectors. A similar exclusion has been done by Elkamhi et al. (2012), among others. Figure
10.7 shows that the broad time pattern of value-at-risk estimates excluding these two sectors is the
same as in the estimates obtained with the whole sample of sectors. The level of value at risk is now
somewhat higher because the excluded sectors contain a large percentage of issuers of IG quality. This
is also reflected in capital requirements from the BIS model, which are now also a bit higher.
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 10.7 )
Filtering the data: Finally, we applied the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the weekly CDS data to elim-
inate possible high frequency noise that could contaminate our estimates, with a negligible effect on
value-at-risk estimates. A similar conclusion is reached if the filter is applied to the time series of cor-
relation estimates before we use them to estimate value at risk by repeated simulation of the Merton
model.
5. Expected Shortfall analysis
Value at risk (VaR) is a simple risk indicator that measures what loss will be exceeded only a small
percentage of times in the next k trading days. As a measure of risk, VaR has some limitations: VaR at
the level α gives no information about the severity of tail losses. Furthermore, VaR may fail to be sub-
additive, depending on the fatness of the tails of the probability distribution of returns, as discussed
by Daníelsson et al. (2013). The lack of subadditivity contradicts the notion that there should be a di-
versification benefit associated with merging portfolios. As a consequence, a decentralization of risk
management using VaR is difficult since we cannot be sure that by aggregating VaR numbers for dif-
ferent portfolios or business units we will obtain a bound for the overall risk of the enterprise. Failure
to be subadditive would also preclude VaR from being a coherent measure of risk.
The drawbacks of VaR as a risk measure are behind the 2010 shift of the Basel Committee in Bank-
ing Supervision to Expected Shortfall (ES) as a more appropriate risk measure. ES accounts for the
magnitudes of large losses as well as the probabilities that they occur. More specifically, ES gives us
the expected value of the loss k days ahead, conditional on it being worse than the VaR at a given level
α. Thus, a precise estimate of VaR is still a requirement when using ES as the risk measure of reference.
Even though ES is clearly a better indicator of a risk position, its use has some difficulties, as pointed
out by Kinateder (2016).23 One of them refers to the difficulty of backtesting ES, as opposed to the ease
of VaR backtesting (see Novales and Garcia-Jorcano (2018) for a comparison of alternative approaches
to ES backtesting).
23Kinateder (2106) compares the minimum capital requirements that arise under Basel II, the 2010 version of Basel III, and
the 2013 version of Basel III.
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To complement our analysis of VaR estimates under the different correlation models, Figure 10.10
shows ES estimates from the four correlation models. As expected, the ES estimates follow the time
pattern of VaR estimates, with a median difference through the sample of 400 basis points. We do not
have a reference estimate of ES obtained from the Basel model, but the underestimation of VaR we
have shown in previous sections suggests a similar underestimation of ES.
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 10.10 )
6. Risk analysis with corporate bond data
A natural question refers to whether the results shown in previous sections are specific to forward-
looking measures of risk. A reduced relevance of the CDS market is an additional reason to look at
other markets. In this section we use corporate bond data to estimate value at risk and compare the
results with those obtained with CDS data for the same set of firms. Given the complexity of bond
data, we perform the analysis with a reduced sample of issuers. We take bond data for the June 2006-
June 2018 period from current issuers included in the MARKIT CDX.NA.IG.31 12/23 index. We started
with an initial group of 125 firms, those for which we had historical prices in either BGN or CBBT,
and 1043 bonds. All data are in USD. We considered senior unsecured bullet bonds to avoid the price
of the bond being affected by the existence of a callable option, and we only included issues over 500
million USD to have some guarantee of liquidity. These two filters help us to interpret the bond spread
as reflecting credit quality, although there will still be some basis risk remaining. We also took those
bonds for which we have data at least 90% of the weeks over the sample period. After application
of the filters we ended up with a portfolio of 45 Investment Grade issuers from the US. At any given
point in time we take for each firm the bond closest to 5-year maturity, since we want to compare VaR
estimates with those obtained from 5-year CDS spreads. We did not include any bond with maturity
below one year. With the filtered data we obtain the asset swap spread, calculating the weekly average
of the available daily data over any given week. Finally, we adjusted the asset swap by the spread
between the swap curve and the 5-year Treasury, so that the spread is referred to the risk-free curve.
We estimated missing weekly spread data by taking the previous observation adjusted by the average
spread change observed that week for the firms in the portfolio.
We report the results of value-at-risk estimation under the Market model. Computing sectoral
factors with only 45 issuers in the sample does not seem too appropriate. We take as global risk factor
for the bond and CDS portfolios the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Total Return Value Unhedged
USD index. This index includes the investment grade, fixed rate, and taxable corporate bond market. It
incorporates USD denominated securities publicly issued by US and non-US industrial, utility and fin-
ancial issuers. To be consistent with CDS data, we have used the index calculated with option-adjusted
spreads (OAS), the spread between a fixed-income security rate and the risk-free rate of return adjus-
ted to take into account the embedded option. Typically, an analyst uses the Treasury securities yield
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for the risk-free rate. The spread is added to the price of the fixed-income security to make the prices
of the risk-free bond and the corporate bond equal to each other. Following Lando (1998) and Duffie
and Singleton (1999), we assume that such a spread in the corporate bond compensates only for credit
risk, and it is therefore comparable with the spread in the credit default swap for that same firm.24
Figure 10.8 shows that median asset correlations follow a very similar pattern in bond and CDS
data. They departed between August 2009 and August 2011, when the correlations in CDS data were
much higher. This was a period of low liquidity in the corporate bond market [see Goldberg and Noz-
awa (2018)], which may have reduced the level of asset correlation. Gross positions among primary
dealers increased throughout the period, closing the gap between corporate bond and CDS correl-
ations. On the contrary, correlations in bond data have been higher since June 2014, although the
correlations in both datasets exhibit similar fluctuations since March 2016. In this period inflation has
followed an approximate linear trend from 0% to almost 3%. Unfortunately, these explanations of the
gaps of opposite signs between the level of asset correlation in the corporate bond and CDS markets
are purely tentative and they would require further work to be confirmed.
Figure 10.9 shows that value-at-risk estimates obtained with CDS and bond data are quite similar.
They differ at some specific points in time, which would be interesting to analyze further. Missing
data are more frequent in bond data than in CDS data, and they are subject to a higher number of
filters, which can explain some of the differences observed between the estimates obtained with both
portfolios. The correlation and value-at-risk figures are similar because the correlation model that is
simulated to estimate value at risk depends just on the correlation parameter and the default probab-
ility, which changes infrequently.
As with the large portfolio analyzed above, CDS data show an increase in risk in mid-2008 that is not
reflected in bond data. After some improvement in market conditions, there is a sudden increase in
risk again in the summer of 2011, because of the US rating downgrade and the crisis of sovereign debt
in Europe. Value-at-risk estimates show a clear improvement in market conditions following Draghi
speech in July 2012. Bond data again suggest an increase in risk in October 2014 that is not so evident
in CDS data, followed by a further deterioration in March 2016. We have a preference for CDS data
because of its forward-looking nature, but explaining the differences between the estimates obtained
from both datasets since mid-2014 remains as an interesting question for further research.
Indeed, value-at-risk estimates with this smaller sample reflect the situation of the US economy
over the years. As expected, the level of value at risk differs from that obtained with the portfolio of
881 firms. The current portfolio has a clear geographic concentration in the USA and most firms are
24As an alternative, we could have used the composite spread of firms with BBB rating for each sector as considered by
Bloomberg, but that data starts in 2009. Still other possibility would be to use the CDX index, but we believe that the mar-
ket risk factor would then be highly correlated with the portfolio, leading to a clear bias in the estimation of asset correlations.
Something similar would happen if we used as market risk factor the first principal component of bond and CDS data, since the
number of firms in the portfolio is small.
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IG, with an A rating. This explains that the required capital is now smaller than for the portfolio of 881
firms, which was global and contained assets of different credit quality.
In summary, with the natural differences due to the composition of the portfolio, the correlation
estimation strategy we have followed seems to work well with both types of data, appropriately captur-
ing the market situation at each point in time. Over 2015, and again since mid-2017, the value at risk
of this high quality portfolio was close to the level estimated by the BIS II model. Nevertheless, over
most of the sample the BIS II model underestimated risk, so that our model could be used to estimate
an add-on of capital as a function of the economic cycle.
(INSERT HERE FIGURES 10.8 AND 10.9 )
7. Model validation
In this section we pursue two different strategies for model validation. We first examine the poten-
tial of our correlation estimates as predictors of economic events. As a proxy of changes in economic
prospects, we take the number of downgrades and upgrades in Investment Grade ratings. After that,
we perform a simulation analysis of a theoretical economy based on our correlation model to see the
extent to which the estimates of the correlation parameter would coincide with the parameter value
chosen for the simulation.
Karagozoglu and Jacobs (2016) modeled the relationship between risk signals in the credit default
swap market and agency credit ratings, and characterized the factors that help explain the variation in
such signals. We assume that changes in risk conditions in the credit market are well represented by
rating changes and we examine whether our model anticipates decision by rating agencies. Indeed,
quarterly aggregates of asset correlation estimates from bond and CDS data show a significant linear
correlation with the number of downgrades in the same quarter as well as over a one-year period.
In the case of CDS data the contemporaneous correlation and the correlation over the following 3
quarters is: 0.50, 0.47, 0.47, 0.42, whereas for the bond data estimates, those linear correlation coeffi-
cients are: 0.42, 0.50, 0.47, 0.38. After that, linear correlation is much weaker. A similar relationship
is not observed with upgrades. A fourth-order vector auto-regression estimated with this quarterly
data produces a significant response of downgrades to an unexpected increase in asset correlation
that reaches its maximum between 3 and 4 quarters after the shock [see Figure 10.11].25 Hence, our
correlation models can anticipate losses derived from risk concentration in credit portfolios.
(INSERT HERE FIGURE 10.11)
As a second validation test, we analyze the precision of estimates of the correlation parameter from
the Sectorial Market model. In that model the correlation between the value of assets of any two firms
25We use quarterly data on upgrades and downgrades from Bloomberg, since 2008. Estimation results are not shown to save
space. Lag length was determined by likelihood-based information criteria.
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in the same sector, normalizad to have a unit variance, is r2s . We start by simulating the model to gen-
erate time series of 365 weeks for the value of assets of 100 firms. The common factor and the idiosyn-
cratic term are drawn independently of each other, with a standard normal distribution.26 The 4,950
pairwise linear correlations between any two firms are, on average, very close to the true parameter
value, r2s . However, deviations from that mean are higher for low values of rs and, more importantly,
the coefficient of variation increases even more rapidly for low values of rs .27 In parallel with this
observation, correlation estimates, being unbiased for any value of rs , also show a higher standard
deviation and higher coefficient of variation for low values of the asset correlation parameter. To give
some insight into this property, let us mention that in a realization of the Monte Carlo simulation ex-
ercise, the coefficient of variation of the correlation estimate was 10% for rs = 0.70, 15% for rs = 0.50,
and 30% for rs = 0.30. That means that while our estimation strategy seems to work well for portfolios
with moderate to high asset correlation, it may lead to a significant estimation error for low asset cor-
relations. With the linear correlations in Table 5, we seem to be on the safe side, expecting to have an
estimation error of around 15% of the true value of the correlation parameter. Similar analysis could
be done with other correlation models.
8. Correlation models with two systemic risk factors
A well-specified factor model must produce an error term (the idiosyncratic component of risk)
that must be uncorrelated across firms. That may be hard to get with a one-factor model due to the
existence of other common effects not captured by the single factor. Therefore, we also consider two-
factor models:
vi,1 = riX + βiZ +
√
1− r2i − β2i ξi, (8.1)
where Z represents a second risk factor that is uncorrelated with X , so that it does not bring any
redundant information into the model. The X and Z factors can be global or sector-specific, and the ri
and βi parameters may again be firm-specific or sector-specific, depending on the model. The term√
1− r2i − β2i ξi represents the idiosyncratic component of firm i. In practical applications, once we
have selected the indicator variable Z* to be used as a second factor, we estimate a regression of Z*
on X using a rolling window sample made up by 52 weekly observations and use the residuals from
that regression as factor Z in the previous equation. The properties of the OLS estimator guarantee
the lack of correlation between both factors. Risk factors will again be standardized, so we will assume
X, Z, ξi ∀i to be pairwise independent standard Normal variables and, as a consequence, changes in
26A simulation exercise similar to the one performed in Strebulaev (2007)
27The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation as a percentage of the mean value
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the value of the firm, vi , will also follow a Normal(0,1) distribution.
We initially consider VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index) as the second
systemic global factor. Being an average of implied volatilities obtained from option quotes, it would
bring to the model an estimate of the market forward-looking perception of risk that would seem a
natural risk factor for the credit market. In the Sectorial and Individual Sectorial models, the ortho-
gonalization of VIX is obtained using the sectorial versions of the credit risk factor, so that the ortho-
gonalized VIX component will be very similar across sectors but not identical, because the credit risk
factor X is sector specific.
Table 6 displays the two-factor model specifications as well as the expressions for the correlation
between any two firms in the same or in a different sector. The correlations with the two risk factors
have not been included in the table, since they are similar to the ones in one-factor models, and they
are estimated similarly. Using the same rolling window sample scheme as in one-factor models, we
obtained a set of parameter estimates for each of the 313 weeks between January 2007 and the end of
2012.
Sectorial correlations with the orthogonalized VIX factor sharply increased between September
2008 and March 2010, the Government sector being the one with the highest correlation. Figure 10.12
shows the time evolution of VaR estimates obtained from models that use VIX as the second risk factor,
together with the estimate of VaR obtained under the one-factor Basel formula. The general pattern is
very similar to the one we obtained with the one-factor model, so that the evidence on the underes-
timation of risk by the Basel formula is robust to the addition of a second risk factor.
Figure 10.13 shows that the difference between VaR estimates from the analogue two- and one-
factor models is not constant. One-factor models underestimate risk prior to September 2009. In
that period, the two-factor VaR estimate is between 20pb. and 40pb. above the one-factor estimate,
except for the trend observed during 2009, when the difference increased to almost 100 bp.. Such
differences between both VaR estimates can be substantial for portfolios with a large nominal value.
After September 2009, financial markets improved thanks to the reforms by President Obama and the
G20 group. Both VaR estimates decreased, and especially so the two-factor model estimate, so they
became more similar.
As an alternative, we use MSCI indices as the second risk factor. The stock market tends to move
opposite to spreads in the credit market, since good news for a firm will raise their market value while
decreasing the perception of risk on loans. Indeed, Chamizo and Novales (2016b) document large
negative linear correlations between MSCI sectorial indices and the corresponding credit sectorial
indices. At a difference of VIX, there are sectorial versions of MSCI that we will use as the second risk
factor in the Sectorial and Individual Sectorial models, similarly to what we did with the credit risk
factor X. Daily MSCI index data was extracted from Blomberg. Figures 10.14 show that VaR estimates
from both two-factor specifications are very close to each other, in spite of the different nature of the
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second factor in both cases. That also means that the volatility VIX index and the MSCI indices were
able to provide the same additional information to the one-factor model, especially during the crisis
period (August 2008-November 2009).
8.1. The dimensionality of factor correlation models
Using the right number of factors is clearly the most important feature of the correlation models
we have been using throughout the paper.28 The high explanatory power of our proposed global risk
factor (GRF) makes it a good choice as a first factor, but we have also shown that a second factor adds
relevant information on asset correlations in stressed times. However, the fact that alternative choices
of a different nature for a second factor, like VIX and MSCI indices, lead to very similar correlation
estimates and almost identical VaR estimates, suggests that there is not much additional information
that could be used to estimate asset correlation.
To confirm that conjecture, we examine the amount of common information among the CDS is-
suers in our sample. To make the problem computationaly feasible, we take random samples of 100
firms from the 881 CDS issuers and compute the correlations between the weekly changes in their as-
set values, the νi1 variable in section 3.29 On the average, over a set of 50 random sample draws, the
90% interval for correlations between νi1 variables was (0.16; 0.66). All of these correlations were pos-
itive, reflecting the syncronicity of asset values. When we consider the component of νi1 not explained
by our estimated GRF, that interval was reduced to (-0.18; 0.29), showing that the first risk factor ex-
plains a substantial amount of the common information among asset values. The use of a second
factor, VIX or MSCI indices, implies a slight additional reduction in correlation, since the information
of these factors is relevant just at specific points in the sample, as explained in previous sections.
Using a principal component methodology, we obtain that just 3 linear combinations of the νi1
variables is enough to explain 50% of the volatility in the asset value of the 881 firms throughout the
sample. When considering the components of νi1 not explained by the GRF the number of required
linear combinations increases to 12, on average. A similar observation applies to higher volatility pro-
portions, showing again the reduction in the amount of common information in firms’ asset value
from using our proposed factor models.
If we had to choose a third risk factor, it would be hard to beat the first principal component of
the νi1 variables across the 881 firms, in terms of information content. We estimated regressions of
νi1 on that principal component, obtaining that 90% of the R-squared values were below 0.66. When
28The information criteria introduce in Bai and Ng (2002) have been extensively used to characterize the right number of
factors (see also Bada et al. (2014) and Kinateder and Wagner (2017) for a discussion in a panel data framework). Unfortunately,
our framework does not allow us to take advantage from those analysis. First, it is very important that the factors are observable,
so that we can refer the model implied correlations to the state of the economy and the financial markets. Second, with 881 CDS
issuers, the available upper bounds for the number of factors would be too large.
29With 100 firms we have 4,950 diferent pairwise correlations. Working with the 881 firms would yield 387,640 such correla-
tions
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we performed a similar exercise for the components of νi1 not explained by the one-factor and two-
factor models, 90% of the R-squared values were below 0.29. Once again, this shows that our proposed
factor models reduce drastically the amount of common information among the time series for the
asset values of the firms in our sample. This does not show that there is not a chance of adding a
third risk factor to our models, but it would seem rather hard to characterize an observable variable
representing such a factor.
9. Implications for regulator y credit risk modelling
The literature on model risk [see for example FED (2011)] places special emphasis on the import-
ance of the development, implementation and use of a given risk model. It also underscores the need
to include backtesting and benchmarking risk estimates. Similar statements have been issued by fin-
ancial regulators and practitioners: “The essential problem is that our models – both risk models and
econometric models – as complex as they have become, are still too simple to capture the full array of gov-
erning variables that drive global economic reality.”, Greenspan (2008). “Whenever we make a model
of something involving human beings, we are trying to force the ugly stepsister’s foot into Cinderella’s
pretty glass slipper. It doesn’t fit without cutting off some essential parts. Models inevitably mask as well
as expose risk. You must start with models and then overlay them with common sense and experience.”,
Derman (2011).
As suggested by Das (2007), the financial system normally focuses on the accuracy of the models
used to calculate VaR, often without a detailed assessment of the assumptions incorporated in them.
However, a given volatility behavior may lead to wildly different credit VaR estimates under alternat-
ive distributional assumptions on returns. Performing the same analysis with different data sources
can also produce disparate results, being hard to prefer one to another. An additional limitation of
risk modelling is acting as if the processes governing financial markets were immutable “laws” com-
parable, say, to the laws of physics. On the contrary, in financial markets, time-invariant phenomena,
if they exist at all, are the exception rather than the rule. The report concludes that credit risk is even
more sensitive than market risk to correlation assumptions, since arbitrary, inaccurate correlation spe-
cifications can cause large errors in capital requirements. That is the reason for the interest in research
on modelling asset correlation.
Precisely, the crisis has shown the need to have more flexible credit risk models that could easily
incorporate the type of changes in correlations that can arise in stressed times. The supervisory stand-
ards for managing model risk FRB SR 11-7 refer to accuracy testing, like VaR backtesting, as a required
tool for model evaluation. But they also cite that benchmarking to alternative model specification
should be an important element of model assessment. Our research strategy has been consistent with
this mandate. We have considered four alternative correlation models, different risk factors, and we
have compared the forward-looking value-at-risk estimates obtained with corporate bond and CDS
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spread data. The fact that the qualitative results of our analysis have been shown to be robust to these
choices makes them reliable, giving more weight to the implied policy recommendations for risk man-
agement and supervision.
Our analysis, as well as those of Dullmann et al. (2007), Lopez (2004) make advances in incorpor-
ating time-varying asset correlations, crucial parameters for credit risk estimation. But, while Dull-
mann et al. (2007) concluded that the results obtained from alternative models were very similar to
those from the BIS II model, we have shown that the Basel II IRB model did not capture the level of
market volatility during the period 2007-2012. In the pre-crisis period (January 2007-April 2007), we
indeed obtain similar results to those from Basel II IRB and from the Dullmann study, which covers
the period 1998-2004. However, during the crisis period (May 2007-December 2012), the results of
the Basel II IRB model are very far from our proposed correlation models. A posteriori it seems quite
reasonable to believe that the requirement of capital during the crisis should have been higher than
before the crisis, due to increased credit correlations, and we have shown that indeed, the information
available in the credit market should have led to significantly higher capital requirements. Having a
higher capital requirement when forward-looking correlations indicate an increase in the level of risk
could well be a way to avoid ”pro-ciclicality”, whereby capital goes up when it is too late and banks are
resource constrained. The BIS correlation is calibrated to the KMV dataset, which is the standard of
the industry and it is based on the asset value of the different firms, which could be less volatile than
CDS market data. Furthermore, the forward-looking information provided by the CDS market might
incorporate some extra premium by illiquidity, which must have been rather high during the crisis.
But it is unlikely that these considerations can explain such large differences between models.30
Rather, we consider that a central question of our analysis is to have explored whether the forward-
looking information provided by the derivative credit market is a good proxy of the “real” credit mar-
ket. Even though the answer is not obvious, it is clear that the “red flags” provided by the derivative
market should be incorporated by the regulators when trying to prevent future difficulties. Indeed, if
credit spreads at some point signaled an increased probability of an extreme credit situation in mar-
ket participants, it would be desirable that regulatory and internal risk models would reflect such a
situation. It would surely be undesirable, and possibly unfeasible, for regulators to react as drastic-
ally as the financial markets, but regulatory capital requirements should reflect market trends as in-
corporated into derivative credit markets. In any event, stripping the relevant information in credit
derivatives to avoid false positives is a challenging issue that deserves further analysis.
Besides these limitations of risk modelling, the conflicts of interest in rating agencies may distort
this crucial input of credit risk estimation. Furthermore, regulatory driven securitization with the aim
of lowering capital requirements has in the past weakened the effect of market regulation. To summar-
ize, regulation is not easy, but it is clearly important to understand what is happening in the market,
30The need to revise the BIS II model for capital requirement as also emphasized by Das (2007).
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which information is relevant, and how it should be incorporated into regulatory models and into
internal credit risk models at financial institutions.
10. Conclusions and open questions
We have estimated the time evolution of value at risk and expected shortfall of a global equally-
weighted credit portfolio at the time of the financial crisis by performing an extensive simulation ex-
ercise that combines a Merton model of the firm with a Vasicek-type correlation model.
The correlation parameters in the Merton model are estimated using the forward-looking inform-
ation contained in CDS spreads rather than the backward-looking information in historical default
rates. Since defaults are very rare events, a very long history is required to obtain a reasonable sample,
raising the issue of whether the relationships estimated from the data would be relevant to the cor-
porate world today. It has also been pointed out that a deficient modelling of correlation under stress
could have been the cause of the failure of pre-crisis stress tests to detect the vulnerabilities of the
financial system [see Oura and Schumacher (2012)]. Our methodology, based on information from
credit derivatives, offers a robust forward-looking analysis of credit correlations under a stress scen-
ario. Furthermore, estimates of economic capital from forward-looking information might provide us
with relevant information about future systemic adverse shocks.
The estimated correlation models are simulated to obtain sample trajectories for the value of the
firm’s assets for each CDS issuer. Along a given trajectory, the value of assets is compared with the
threshold for default that emerges from the physical probability of default associated to the issuer
rating. If default occurs, there is an implied loss, and the portfolio P&L is computed at each point in
time by aggregating losses across all firms in the portfolio. Repeating the exercise for a large number
of trajectories, we estimate the portfolio’s value at risk and expected shortfall by taking the appropriate
quantile of the distribution of P&L and the average return over the tail.
On the basis of our results for the 2007-2012 period, a single risk factor model seems as a good
representation of credit market correlation because of the high inter-sectoral correlations. However,
an appropriately chosen second factor provides additional information for risk estimation in stressed
times. Yet the overall impression is that the failure of models to predict the crisis was not because they
were over-simplified but rather, because they were backward-looking.
We obtain the following results from our analysis: First, our estimates clearly show that there were
signs of stress in the credit market prior to the crisis that the financial sector did not appropriately in-
troduce into its internal risk models. Such information was also not used by regulators, with required
capital falling well below what had been needed under our VaR estimates. These results justify the
increased attention being paid to risk management at the portfolio level, rather than at the level of a
single firm, in order to minimize the possibility of an excessive concentration on common sources of
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risk that might derive in future problems for a financial institution. Furthermore, we have provided
evidence suggesting that the VaR of a given sector depends not only on the average PD of issuers in
that sector but also on their degree of risk heterogeneity (as in Gordy and Lütkebohmert (2013)) . In-
deed, our correlation models can anticipate losses derived from risk concentration in credit portfolios.
Finally, these qualitative results have been confirmed by using corporate bond return data instead of
CDS spreads.
The credit derivative market has a strong speculative component and it is very illiquid, but it has
been very good at reflecting the economic circumstances of each moment. So, it is hard to see why
the forward-looking information embedded in credit derivatives should lead to capital requirements
so much higher than using the Basel II model, as shown in this paper. Such disparate evidence sug-
gests that the calibration of the Basel II function for capital requirement should incorporate changes
in credit market expectations. Nevertheless, differences between both approaches over more stable
periods might be much less significant.
It would be interesting to obtain VaR estimates for the real risk exposure of the credit market as a
whole, instead of assuming an equal exposure to each issuer. Also, our approach could be generalized
to incorporate into the correlation models a different volatility for each sector and for each firm, to be
estimated from actual data. An even more challenging extension would consider time varying volat-
ilities, levels of debt and rates of growth of the value of assets, following the work of Du et al. (2016).
A model calibrated solely to CDS data may have inflated parameters. Thus, it would be interesting to
discount from the estimated correlation the effect of market sentiment and use that lower correlation
to estimate risk indicators. A preliminary analysis shows that the VIX index and the MSCI indices ex-
plain a substantial part of our correlation estimates. Finally, a departure from the Gaussian framework
maintained in our analysis could have a sizeable impact on VaR estimates of credit portfolios. These
remain as interesting issues for further research.
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Appendix
Table 1: Distribution of firms in the sample by industry and region: 2006-2012
Industry/Region AF AS CA EE EU IN LA ME NA OC OS SU T
Basic materials (BM) 14 17 1 2 33 2 69
Consumer goods (CG) 26 33 54 2 115
Consumer services (CS) 1 20 35 1 52 3 112
Energy (EN) 7 1 6 2 33 1 50
Financials (FN) 30 1 69 1 1 61 10 173
Government (GOV) 4 20 1 13 14 2 12 5 1 1 73
Health Care (HC) 4 1 24 29
Industrials (IND) 28 30 1 46 4 1 1 111
Technology (TECH) 11 5 16 1 33
Telecommunication services (TEL) 9 1 20 14 3 47
Utilities (UTI) 13 27 1 27 1 69
Total (T) 5 178 2 15 260 5 18 7 361 25 3 2 881
Note: The table shows the distribution of firms in the sample across regions and sectors. AF:Africa, AS: Asia, CA: Caribbean.
E.E.: Eastern Europe, EU: Europe, IN: India, LA: Latin America, ME: Middle East, NA: North America, OC: Oceania, OF:
Offshore, SU:Supra, T: Total. Offshore and Supranation are geographic categories in Markit database. Supranation refers to
CDS from public organizations.
Table 2: Industry-rating distribution of firms in the sample: June 30, 2006
Rating/Industry BM CG CS EN F G HC I TH TL UT T
AAA 2 6 6 1 15
AA 6 6 6 44 6 5 1 2 3 13 92
A 21 27 21 12 74 30 5 32 9 20 22 273
BBB 30 53 54 22 42 7 11 54 8 17 24 322
BB 11 23 20 10 6 17 6 16 10 3 7 129
B 7 3 11 1 6 1 7 3 3 3 45
CCC 1 1 1 1 1 5
Total 69 115 112 50 173 73 29 111 33 47 69 881
Note: The table shows the distribution of firms with a given rating in each sector at the beginning of the sample. BM: Basic
materials, CG: Consumer goods, CS: Consumer services, EN: Energy , F: Financials, G: Government, HC: Health care, I:
Industrials, TH: Technology, TL:Telecommunication services, UT: Utilities and T: Total.
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Table 3: Industry-rating distribution of firms in the sample: June 30, 2012
Rating/Industry BM CG CS EN F G HC I TH TL UT T PD
AAA 2 2 0.01%
AA 5 8 5 18 7 3 2 3 9 60 0.03%
A 18 27 13 12 84 22 10 30 7 18 18 259 0.07%
BBB 31 48 57 28 57 25 7 50 13 18 34 368 0.20%
BB 18 21 16 5 6 11 4 23 8 4 7 123 1.14%
B 2 11 15 4 5 5 7 2 2 1 54 4.04%
CCC 3 3 4 1 1 1 2 15 13.76%
Total 69 115 112 50 173 73 29 111 33 47 69 881
Note: The table shows the distribution of firms with a given rating in each sector at the end of the sample. BM: Basic materials,
CG: Consumer goods, CS: Consumer services, EN: Energy , F: Financials, G: Government, HC: Health care, I: Industrials,
TH: Technology, TL:Telecommunication services, UT: Utilities and T: Total. PD: Probability of default. Data taken from
Exhibit 23: ’Annual Credit Loss Rates by Letter Rating, 1982-2012*’ in Ou et al. (2013). The AAA default probability has
been rounded up to 0.01% .
Table 4: Main features of one-factor correlation models
-
Model name Factor Correlation parameter Factor equation Correlation parameter (r)
Basel II IRB Global PD dependent vi,1 = rPDiX +
√
1− r2PDiξi rPDi =
√
0.24− 0.12(1− e−50PDi )
Market Global Firm specific vi,1 = riX +
√
1− r2i ξi ri = Corr(∆MDDi,∆X)
Sectorial Market Global Sector specific vi,1 = rsX +
√
1− r2sξi rs = medi[Corr(∆MDDi,∆X)]
Sectorial Sector Sector specific vi,1 = rsXs +
√
1− r2sξi rs = medi[Corr(∆MDDi,∆MXs)]
Individual Sectorial Sector Firm specific vi,1 = riXs +
√
1− r2i ξi ri = Corr(∆MDDi,∆Xs)
Note: The table shows the main characteristics of one-factor correlation models. The last column shows the expressions used
in the paper to estimate the correlation parameters.
Table 5: Correlations with global and sectorial risk factors
correlations with Global factor Correlations with Sectorial factor
Sector mean median 1Q 3Q mean median 1Q 3Q
BM 0.43 0.46 0.26 0.46 0.43 0.46 0.26 0.46
CG 0.41 0.43 0.26 0.58 0.41 0.43 0.26 0.58
CS 0.41 0.44 0.23 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.23 0.44
EN 0.44 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.32 0.47
FN 0.44 0.46 0.28 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.28 0.46
GOV 0.42 0.45 0.26 0.45 0.42 0.45 0.26 0.45
HC 0.32 0.33 0.10 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.10 0.33
IND 0.42 0.44 0.24 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.24 0.44
TECH 0.34 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.13 0.34
TEL 0.44 0.46 0.25 0.46 0.44 0.46 0.25 0.46
UTI 0.39 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.23 0.42
Note: Summary statistics for correlations between firms and the Global and Sectorial risk factors. Q1 and Q3 are the first and
third cuartiles. The Global risk factor is estimated as the first principal component across all the issuers in the sample.
The Sectorial risk factor is estimated as the first principal component acros the issuers in each sector.
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Cuadro 6: Two-factor models and correlations between any two firms
Correlation between two firms:
Model From the same sector (s, s) From different sectors(s, z)
Market νi = ri,XX + ri,ZZ +
√
1− r2i,X − r2i,Zξi ri,Xrj,X + ri,Zrj,Z ri,Xrj,X + ri,Zrj,Z
Sectorial Market νi = rs,XX + rs,ZZ +
√
1− r2s,X − r2i,Zξi r2s,X + r2s,Z rs,Xrz,X + rs,Zrz,Z
Sectorial νi = rs,XsXs + rs,ZZ +
√
1− r2s,Xs − r2i,Zξi r2s,Xs + r2s,Z rs,Xsrz,XωX,s,z + rs,Zrz,Z
Individual Sectorial νi = ri,XsXs + ri,ZZ +
√
1− r2i,Xs − r2i,Zξi ri,Xsrj,X + ri,Zrj,Z ri,Xsrj,XωX,s,z + ri,Zrj,Z
Note: Two-factor correlation models. The last two columns show the correlations for any two firms in the same sector or in
different sectors.
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Figure 10.1: Average probability of default, by sector. 2006-2012
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Note: Average probability of default across firms in each sector. These are physical probabilities of default estimated from
Moody’s ratings.
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Figure 10.2: Median intra-sector asset correlation: 2007-2012
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Note: Time evolution of median asset correlations for firms in each sector. BM: Basic materials, CG: Consumer goods,
CS: Consumer services, EN: Energy, F: Financials, G: Government, HC: Health care, I: Industrials, TH: Technology,
TL:Telecommunication services, UT: Utilities.
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Figure 10.3: Inter-sector correlation with the financial sector: 2007-2012
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Note: Time evolution of the median asset correlation between each sector and the financial sector. BM: Basic materials, CG:
Consumer goods, CS: Consumer services, EN: Energy, F: Financials, G: Government, HC: Health care, I: Industrials, TH:
Technology, TL:Telecommunication services, UT: Utilities.
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Figure 10.4: Inter-sector correlation with the utilities sector: 2007-2012
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Note: Time evolution of the median asset correlation between each sector and the utilities sector. BM: Basic materials, CG:
Consumer goods, CS: Consumer services, EN: Energy, F: Financials, G: Government, HC: Health care, I: Industrials, TH:
Technology, TL:Telecommunication services, UT: Utilities.
Figure 10.5: Asset Correlations: January 2007 and December 2012
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Note: The figure shows the histogram of 881 asset correlations at the beginning and at the end of the sample (2007-2012).
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Figure 10.6: VaR estimates with different correlation models: 2007-2012
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Note: VaR estimates under one-factor correlation models: Basel II, Market model, Sectorial Market model, Sectorial model,
Individual Sectorial model.
Phases: (1) Subprime crisis, (2), Lehman default, (3) US stimulus act, (4) Eurozone crisis, (5) EU measures, (6) US rating down-
grade, and (7) Draghi measures.
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Figure 10.7: VaR estimates with different correlation models, excluding the Government and Financial sectors
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Note: VaR estimates under one-factor correlation models: Basel II, Market model, Sectorial Market model, Sectorial model,
Individual Sectorial model, excluding the Government and Financial sectors.
Phases: (1) Subprime crisis, (2), Lehman default, (3) US stimulus act, (4) Eurozone crisis, (5) EU measures, (6) US rating down-
grade, and (7) Draghi measures.
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Figure 10.8: Median asset correlation for the portfolio of 45 CDX Investment Grade firms
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Note: The graph shows the median asset correlation for the sample of 45 CDX Investment Grade firms. The red line shows
the median asset correlation estimated from corporate bond data. The green line shows the median asset correlation
estimated from CDS data.
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Figure 10.9: VaR estimates or the portfolio of 45 CDX Investment Grade firms
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Note: The graph shows the time evolution of VaR estimates for the portfolio of 45 CDX Investment Grade firms using the Market
model. The red line shows VaR estimates using the asset correlations obtained from corporate bond data. The green line
shows VaR estimates using the asset correlations obtained from CDS data. The blue line are the VaR estimates from the
Basel II model.
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Figure 10.10: ES estimates with different models: 2007-2012 excluding the Government and Financial sectors
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Note: ES estimates under one-factor correlation models: Basel II, Market model, Sectorial Market model, Sectorial model,
Individual Sectorial model, excluding the Government and Financial sectors.
Phases: (1) Subprime crisis, (2), Lehman default, (3) US stimulus act, (4) Eurozone crisis, (5) EU measures, (6) US rating down-
grade, and (7) Draghi measures.
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Figure 10.11: Impulse responses
Note: The first graph shows the impulse response function of downgrades to a shock in asset correlation. The second graph
shows the impulse responses of asset correlation to a shock in downgrades. The units of the horizontal axis are quarters.
Impulse responses are obtained with the Choleski decomposition of the matrix of innovations in a vector autoregression
of order two, estimated with quarterly data.
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Figure 10.12: VaR estimates using VIX as the second risk factor
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Note: VaR estimates from the one-factor Basel II model and two-factor correlation models, using VIX as the second risk factor:
Market model, Sectorial Market model, Sectorial model, Individual Sectorial model.
Figure 10.13: Difference between VaR estimates from similar two- and one-factor models
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Note: The graph shows the differences between VaR estimates from two- and one-factor models (Market model (blue line),
Sectorial market model (red line), Sectorial model (green line), and Individual Sectorial model (purple line). Each line
shows the 3-month moving average of such difference for a given correlation model.
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Figure 10.14: VaR estimates from alternative two-factor correlation models
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Note: Each graph displays VaR estimates from a given correlation model (Market model, Sectorial model, Sectorial Market
model and Individual Sectorial model), using a global credit risk factor as the first factor and either VIX (blue line) or
MSCI indices (red line) as the second risk factor.
